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Jurisdiction Size and Director Compensation in Connecticut Local Health 
Departments 
Abstract 
Objective: To examine if the compensation of local public health directors responds to organizational size 
in the same manner found for other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public managers. 
Design: Panel data ordinary least squares with fixed effects for the local health department and time 
period. Control variables include median household income, the unemployment rate, and the part-time 
versus full-time and independent versus district status of the local public health department. 
Setting: Sample of Connecticut local health departments over the period from 2001 to 2011. 
Main Outcome Measures: Annual wage of the local public health director and population in the 
jurisdiction of the local public health department. 
Results: The size elasticity of local public health director equals 0.2. Full-time directors are paid more than 
part-time directors and directors managing district health departments are compensated more than those 
directing independent health departments. Directors are paid more if they manage health departments in 
jurisdictions with higher levels of income. 
Conclusions: The findings for the size elasticity of compensation for local public health directors 
compares very closely to the size elasticity estimates found for other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and 
public managers, perhaps suggesting that local public health directors are similarly motivated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
o study to date has examined whether the compensation of local public health (LHD) 
directors varies systematically with respect to organizational size, yet numerous studies 
have investigated the effect of organizational size on the compensation of other types of 
for-profit (FP), not-for-profit (NFP), and public managers. The strong relationship between firm 
size and managerial pay is what some economists refer to as the "best-established empirical 
regularity concerning executive compensation.”
1
 In fact, one meta-analysis evaluates the effect 
of firm performance and organizational size on executive compensation, and concludes that more 
than 40% of the variance in executive pay can be attributed to size, while less than 5% is due to 
performance.
2
 
 
The key statistic for this research is the elasticity of pay with respect to organizational size, 
which reflects the percentage change in compensation resulting from a percentage change in 
organizational size. Theoretically, this statistic is greater than zero because managers are 
expected to be paid more when they operate larger organizations. Among the many reasons, 
managers face a greater scope and breadth of responsibilities in larger organizations. For 
example, larger organizations may produce more diverse products or cater to heterogeneous 
consumers. In addition, larger companies may be organized in a hierarchical fashion, which adds 
to the complexity of running the firm. Finally, directing large organizations may concern risk-
averse managers and require a greater investment of their human capital.  
 
Previous studies suggest that the size elasticity of compensation for chief executive officers 
(CEOs) in industrial firms falls within the 0.2 to 0.3 range, whereas the comparable statistic for 
CEOs of firms with more liquid assets, such those in the insurance, banking, or finance industry, 
lie within the 0.1 to 0.2 range. For managers in the public sector such as superintendents of 
schools, tax assessors, city managers, and tax collectors, the estimated size elasticities of 
managerial compensation fall within a narrower range between 0.11 and 0.18. The comparable 
estimates for NFP managers vary to a greater degree within a 0.1 to 0.7 range with those for 
hospital CEOs at the higher end.  
 
METHODS 
 
Based on the previous literature, the relationship between jurisdiction size and the pay of the 
LHD director is specified as:  
 
log⁡(𝑃𝐴𝑌)𝑖,𝑡⁡ =⁡𝛽0 + 𝛽1log⁡(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4log(MHI)i,t⁡+𝛽5log⁡(𝑈)𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 
where PAY equals the annual compensation of the LHD directors, SIZE is measured by the 
population serviced by the various LHDs, PT and DIST are dummy variables reflecting whether 
the LHDs are organized on a part-time basis or possess district status, MHI and U stand for the 
median household income and unemployment rate in the area serviced by the LHDs, and the 
subscripts i and t represent the specific LHD and year, respectively. Note that variables capturing 
the personal attributes of the LHD directors would normally be specified if the data were 
available. Because both PAY and SIZE are expressed as logarithms, the coefficient⁡𝛽1, reveals 
the size elasticity of compensation for LHD director compensation.  
N 
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The sample includes 796 LHD observations in Connecticut over the 2001 to 2011 period for 
which the necessary data are available. Included in those observations are 279 part-time, 310 
full-time municipal, and 207 full-time district LHD-year observations. Given the two dummy 
variables specified in Equation 1, it follows that the full-time municipal LHD serves as the 
default specification. Part-time directors obviously work less and their compensation should 
reflect the lower work load. Compared to full-time, independent LHDs, district LHDs work and 
cooperate with representatives from many different towns and cities on their board of directors, 
leading to additional implied responsibilities that may contribute to a higher level of 
compensation, ceteris paribus.  
 
Median household income and the unemployment rate control for two important economic 
factors that may affect pay differentials across the various public health departments in 
Connecticut and over time. For example, cities with higher levels of MHI may pay their directors 
more because of the higher cost of living or because they value public health services more 
greatly. Population figures are added and data for MHI and U are averaged across towns 
participating in a regional district. Descriptive statistics and data sources are shown in Table 1 
for all of the variables used in our analysis.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and data sources  
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Data 
Source 
Annual Salary ($) 61,760 40,334 600 180,139 1 
Population in the  
Jurisdiction 
46,009 39,992 1,597 166,429 1 
Part-time 
Status 
0.35 NA 0 1 1 
District Status 0.6 NA 0 1 1 
Median Household 
Income ($) 
76,655 27,955 26,055 187,581 2 
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.1 2.3 1 16.2 2 
(1) Unpublished data, Connecticut Public Health Department 
(2) Connecticut Economic Resource Center’s (CERC) Town Profiles, https://www.cerc.com/TownProfiles/ 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
When estimating Equation 1, standard errors are made fully robust against arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation by clustering them at the LHD level.
3
 LHD- and time-
fixed effects are also specified in the regression equation. The LHD-fixed effects help to control 
for any unmeasurable time-invariant factors affecting the compensation of the directors across 
the various LHDs such as housing values and citizen preferences and thereby help to reduce the 
bias normally associated with unobservable heterogeneity. The time-fixed effects capture 
changes common to all jurisdictions over time, such as general price inflation and technological 
change. 
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The equations are estimated by the ordinary least squares technique for panel data. The second 
column of Table 2 reports the multiple regression results. First note that over 95% of the 
variation in the compensation of the directors can be explained by the various right-hand side 
variables and the two fixed effects. 
 
    Table 2. Multiple regression results 
Dependent variable: log of pay 
Independent variable Estimated Coefficient 
(absolute value of t-statistic) 
Constant 3.84 
(1.75) 
Log of population 0.21* 
(2.11) 
Part-time LHD -1.22** 
(9.73) 
District LHD 0.63* 
(2.07) 
Log of median household income 0.49** 
(2.88) 
Log of unemployment rate 0.22** 
(2.65) 
  
Adjusted R2 0.954 
Observations 796 
      **Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
                      *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
 
As expected, the estimated coefficient on the part-time status variable is negative and highly 
significant. Its coefficient means that part-time directors are paid about 70% less than otherwise 
comparable full-time directors. Also as anticipated, the estimated coefficient on the full-time 
district director dummy variable is positive and statistically different from zero. The relatively 
large computed pay differential of 88% probably reflects that, in addition to workload and 
responsibility level, the attributes of full-time independent and district directors also typically 
differ. In addition, the empirical results suggest that directors are paid more in wealthier areas 
and where the unemployment rate is higher.  
 
More important for the research at hand, the estimated coefficient on the log of population equals 
0.21. This means that a 10% increase in jurisdiction size increases director pay by about 2%. 
Using sample averages, as shown in Table 1, simulations show that an increase in jurisdiction 
size of approximately 4600 people raises the typical director’s pay by about $1200. This 
estimated size elasticity for LHD directors is slightly higher than the size elasticity estimates for 
other types of public administrators and near to the estimates found for industrial corporate 
CEOs. 
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IMPLICATIONS 
 
The empirical analysis reveals that the pay of LHD directors responds directly to greater 
jurisdiction size with an elasticity of approximately 0.2. This elasticity of director pay with 
respect to jurisdiction size generally agrees with previous research analyzing the pay of other 
administrators such as superintendents of schools, tax collectors and assessors, and hospital and 
private industry CEOs, suggesting that local public health directors may be similarly motivated. 
Taken as a whole, the literature on managerial compensation may suggest that the market for 
managerial talent “works” at least in one respect.  
 
Of course, the results of this paper reflect the relationship between director pay and 
organizational size for LHDs in one relatively affluent state. Thus, other researchers, perhaps 
those with data for the attributes of the LHD director and measures of director performance, are 
encouraged to further explore this topic.  
 
 
SUMMARY BOX 
What is already known about this topic? While numerous studies have investigated the effect of 
organizational size on the compensation of other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public 
managers, no study to date has examined if the compensation of local public health (LHD) directors 
varies systematically with respect to organizational size.  
 
What is added by this report? This study finds empirically that the pay of LHD directors responds 
directly to greater jurisdiction size with an elasticity of approximately 0.2, meaning that a 10% larger 
jurisdiction pays its director about 2% more pay.  
 
What are the implications for public health practice, policy, and research? This estimated elasticity 
of director pay with respect to organizations size agrees with previous research analyzing the pay of 
other types of managers which may suggest that local public health directors are similarly motivated 
and that the market for managerial talent works at least in one respect.     
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